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Abstract. Trajectory datasets are becoming popular due to the massive usage of GPS and location-
based services. In this paper, we address privacy issues regarding the identification of individuals in
static trajectory datasets. We first adopt the notion of k-anonymity to trajectories and propose a novel
generalization-based approach for anonymization of trajectories. We further show that releasing
anonymized trajectories may still have some privacy leaks. Therefore we propose a randomization
based reconstruction algorithm for releasing anonymized trajectory data and also present how the
underlying techniques can be adapted to other anonymity standards. The experimental results on
real and synthetic trajectory datasets show the effectiveness of the proposed techniques.
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1 Introduction
Mobile service providers can now predict the location of mobile users via triangulation
with a high precision. Coupled with applications such as location-based services (LBS)
that are enabled by GPS equipped mobile devices, it is now very easy to track the location
of individuals voluntarily or non-voluntarily over a period of time in the form of trajec-
tories. Trajectories of individuals collected over months or years contain valuable infor-
mation which can be harvested by data mining tools. Applications of data mining mod-
els obtained from trajectories include city traffic planning, and intelligent transportation
[16, 21]. On the other hand, the trajectories of people contain many forms of sensitive in-
formation, therefore trajectories cannot be released for public use before they are properly
anonymized. One may think that removing the personally identifying information from
trajectories would be enough for anonymizing them. However, such a naive method does
not work even for simple tabular data. This is due to the fact that the released database can
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be linked to public databases through a set of common attributes which are called quasi-
identifiers. For example, in [42], it has been shown that the combination of zip code, and
birth date is unique for 87% of the citizens in US. This figure increases as more attributes
are added to the combination. The problem of linkage becomes even more complicated in
our highly connected world as the number, variety, and ubiquity of data sources increase.
In case of trajectory data, space and time attributes are very powerful quasi-identifiers
which can be linked to various other types of data. Consider the trajectory of a worker who
starts at a specific location every weekday in the morning and reaches another location in
an hour. Even if there is no directly identifying information in this trajectory, it is very easy
to infer that the starting location in the morning is home, and the location reached after an
hour is the work place. What an adversary can do is to look at a phone directory to search
for home addresses and work addresses to link the trajectories with their owners.
In general, the solution to prevent linkage attacks in de-identified data sets is anonym-
ization [42, 41], and k-anonymity was proposed as a standard for privacy over relational
databases. We can summarize k-Anonymity as “safety in numbers” which ensures that
every entity in the table is indistinguishable from k−1 other entities. Achieving optimal k-
anonymity was proven to be NP-Hard, therefore heuristic algorithms have been proposed
in the literature to k-anonymize data sets. In case of trajectory data sets, the problem of an-
onymization is even harder since consecutive points in a trajectory are dependent on each
other. Therefore anonymization should consider every trajectory as a whole for anonym-
ization. In this paper, We first extend the notion of k-anonymity for trajectories and then
describe a heuristic method for achieving k-anonymity of trajectories. We then propose a
technique for publishing trajectories which is based on releasing a representative trajectory
to further protect privacy. While k-anonymity provides indistinguishability between dif-
ferent entities, it does not necessarily protect against disclosure of sensitive information in
some scenarios. This is the case especially when most members of a given indistinguish-
able group have common sensitive information. This issue has been addressed by several
works [28, 30, 32] mostly by enforcing constraints on the groups formed by the anonymizer.
In this paper, we take k-anonymity as the base and discuss how the proposed trajectory k-
anonymity method can be extended to other standards for anonymity.
Outline of the paper. In Section 2we give somemotivating applications for anonymization
of static trajectory and sequence datasets. In Section 3 related work on privacy over rela-
tional databases and spatio-temporal data is presented. We then describe the problem of
trajectory anonymity in Section 4. Detailed algorithms on how to obtain generalized trajec-
tories and results on the computational complexity are given in Section 5, while in Section 6
we propose a reconstruction step to release only a representative trajectory instead of gen-
eralized trajectories. Empirical results on both synthetic and real data sets were presented
in Section 7. Discussions on how the underlying methodology can be extended for other
anonymity standards are in Section 8. Finally, in Section 9, we conclude the paper and
outline future research directions.
2 Motivating Applications
A number of applications motivate our work. In this section, we give several examples
of interesting and emerging applications where privacy over static trajectory or sequence
dataset is of paramount importance:
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2.1 Data Analysis and Mining
As the use of mobile devices grows rapidly, the value of storing spatio-temporal data is
better understood. Business companies, governments, and science institutes are heavily
collecting and storing spatio-temporal data to extract useful and relevant information [40,
34, 45, 35, 31, 13].
The applications over mobile data, such as GPS data, is no longer limited to location-
based servicing or querying. Several spatio-temporal data mining techniques has been
developed. Such techniques have been used by companies to maximize employee effi-
ciency [34], by governments to understand the infrastructure [45] and by research groups
to observe human behavior [35, 31, 40].
We stress that the output of mining algorithmsmight fail to remove all individually identi-
fying information In fact, work in [6, 5] shows that even simple statistics such as the highest
counts over column projections (same as frequent itemset mining in data mining literature)
may violate anonymity based privacy definitions. In other words, information regarding
very few people may be released, allowing possible linking/joining attacks through the
use of some columns. Therefore, in order to release statistics over any dataset, provable an-
onymization techniques must be applied before computing statistics and/or mining. Our
paper provides such techniques for spatio-temporal trajectory datasets, that can be used
before any non anonymity-preserving mining or analysis algorithms.
2.2 Trajectory Data Sharing and Outsourcing
As in the case of conventional databases, storing of spatio-temporal data along with the
variety and importance of applications necessitate the release of the data. Since most tra-
jectory databases contain personal information, publicizing such databases is subject to
privacy regulations and requires de-identification [17, 18, 25]. One of the most effective
and recognized technique for de-identification is anonymization [25].
Even though human data is subject to changes, most real world applications work on
static data. The reason is the high cost of mining dynamic information in terms of both
accuracy and efficiency. Most systems instead follow a trade-off. Changes in the system
are captured by incremental mining up to date data periodically (e.g. monitor the traffic
continuously but mine the data every week) or updating the existing data mining model
with fresh data. In either cases, static databases are valuable. This is the case when shar-
ing trajectory databases for outsourced trajectory analysis. As a typical example, we have
municipalities willing to perform traffic data analysis but with limited internal skills.
2.3 Web Analytics and other Log-based Activities
Web analytics, that is, analysis and mining of user traces, is not only becoming of funda-
mental importance for internet business, but also posing serious privacy concerns.
A notable event related to this privacy problem is American Online’s (AOL) release of
massive amounts of log data. The data included queries done by those users in a three
month period in 2006, as well as the search results clicked. Although therewas no personally-
identifiable data linked to these accounts, a number of attacks have been performed by
intersecting queries and some domain knowledge.
In this paper we are focused on trajectories which are sequences of spatio-temporal points.
Nevertheless, the generalization-based approach we are proposing can be easily adapted
to different kinds of sequences, such as web server logs of page visits.
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Here we only sketch the idea on how to extend trajectory anonymity to web server logs.
Suppose the trajectory anonymization algorithm recognizes the second page of a visit, namely:
session=8545634 page_sequence=2
servername.com/sect1/sect1.2/page1.html
as an infrequent “point” among the user web traces. In this case, the point may be general-
ized to, e.g.,
session=8545634 page_sequence=[2 OR 3]
servername.com/section1/*
by suppressing or using or a user-provided page hierarchy. Notice that this kind of gener-
alization cannot be computed by relational k-anonymity algorithms [39] since the sequence
information of the user trace would not be taken into account appropriately. Even if we
ignore ordering among page visits, session or user pseudo-ID columns will force the ano-
nymization process to consider pages of the same user. This will bring to possibly overes-
timating privacy protection (e.g., when a user has visited several pages) but, more often,
reducing the effectiveness by suppressing unnecessary data (e.g., when a user visited less
than k pages).
3 Related Work
3.1 k-Anonymity and Privacy over Relational Databases
Addressing privacy concerns when releasing person specific datasets is well studied in
the literature [41, 32, 4, 30, 37]. Simply removing uniquely identifying information (SSN,
name) from the released data is not sufficient to prevent identification because partially
identifying attributes called quasi-identifiers such as age, sex, and city can still be mapped
to individuals by using external knowledge [42]. k-Anonymity is defined in [41], as a pri-
vacy standard to protect against identification of individuals in person specific datasets. A
dataset is k-anonymous if each record over quasi-identifiers appears at least k times.
k-Anonymity property ensures that a given set of quasi identifiers can only be mapped
to at least k entities in the dataset. The most common technique being used to anonymize
a given dataset is value generalizations and suppressions. In multidimensional space, the
counter part of these operations is replacing a set of points with the minimum bounding
box that covers the points. It should be noted that k-anonymization via generalizations and
suppressions preserves the truth of the data; explaining the data at a higher granularity.
Entities in trajectory datasets aremore complex than those studied by classical k-anonymity
approaches. Anonymization of complex entities was proposed in [39] where data about
private entities reside in multiple datasets of a relational database. Even though trajectory
datasets can be represented in relational databases, order of points over a given trajectory
matters due to the linear time property. Work in [39] does not assume any ordering between
points. Also applications over trajectory databases are very specific and require different
cost metrics and different anonymization techniques.
In [32] authors also warn that, in each set of people with same values for the anonymized
QI ℓ-diversitymust hold, i.e., sensitive attribute valuesmust be diverse enough. Otherwise,
it is possible to infer the exact sensitive value with arbitrarily high probability. We will
discuss how to extend the concept of ℓ-diversity for trajectory dataset in Section 8.
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As done in previous work on LBS and trajectory privacy, we will not directly address ℓ-
diversity issues during the presentation, while we will sketch some possible approaches to
this interesting issue as a future work in Section 9.
3.2 Privacy-preserving LBS
A considerable amount of research has been conducted on privacy issues regarding the use
of location based services (LBSs) by mobile users. Most work defined the privacy risk as
linking of requests and locations to specific mobile users. Works in [15, 26] used pertur-
bation and obfuscation techniques to deidentify a given request or a location; they differ
from our work in the privacy constraints they enforce. Anonymization based privacy pro-
tection was used in [19, 7, 22, 23, 36, 12]. In [23], anonymity was enforced on sensitive
locations rather than user location points or trajectories. In [19, 22, 36, 12, 3], individual
location points belonging to a user are assumed to be unlinked and points of the users are
anonymized rather than the trajectories. In [7], anonymization process enforces points re-
ferring to same set of users to be anonymized together all the time. However their work
assumes anonymization per request rather than whole trajectory anonymization and the
heuristic to specify groups of users is restricted to a specific time frame. (Such an approach
does not anonymize time.) In [20], location privacy is protected via cryptographic tech-
niques based on the theoretical work on private information retrieval.
3.3 Trace and Trajectory Anonymization
All of the proposed privacy preservation methods on LBSs so far assume a dynamic, real-
time environment and methodology being used is based on local decisions. We are also
aware of very recent, independent research [8, 27, 43] addressing the problem of preserv-
ing privacy in static trajectory databases. Both works rely on uncertainty in the spatio-
temporal data in order to enforce anonymity. The first technique [8] protects privacy by
shifting trajectory points in space that are already close to each other in time. Clusters of
k trajectories are enforced to be close to each other so that they fall in the same area of
uncertainty given by a user parameter representing the GPS precision. The second work
[27] presents a subsampling-based algorithm, i.e., privacy is preserved by removing some
points s.t. uncertainty between consecutive points is increased to avoid identification. Due
to the inherit uncertainty assumption of both works on trajectories, the privacy constraints
enforced and the cost metric do not match with those used in this work. Work in [43] limits
the probability of disclosing the tail of the trajectories given the head of the trajectories. The
proposed technique is limited since it is suppression based and the protection is one way.
In this work, we address the privacy concerns when publishing static trajectory databases
by extending the concept of k-anonymity to trajectories. We model trajectories in a general
way (sequences of spatio-temporal points) such that the same techniques can be possibly
used in another context such as sequence events, strings, non-euclidean spaces, etc. with-
out much effort.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that extends the concept of relational
k-anonymity to trajectories without relying on data distortion and uncertainty. We instead
remove information from the data by making use of space and time generalizations, point
alignment both in space and time, point and trajectory suppressions. The basic method-
ology does not rely on uncertainty (as was the case in previous work). The cost metric
we used is statistically derived and captures time and space sensitivity to address various
applications. Also no previous work seems to have measured the level of distortion due
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to anonymization in the context of trajectory mining applications, which we consider to be
one of the ultimate goals of trajectory publishing.
In systems where freshness of the data is crucial (e.g., healthcare data, stream data), re-
lease (and anonymization) of data needs to be on the fly. An important example is authen-
ticated LBS, where authenticated users send streams of queries to a service provider, and
a trusted anonymizer filters the communication by applying anonymization techniques.
To the best of our knowledge, no work on authenticated LBS studied space-time gener-
alization, although it is considered a state-of-the-art technique for non-authenticated LBS.
Our work makes the assumption that all the data is static. Adapting trajectory k-anonymi-
zation framework given in this paper for such online systems is no different than adapting
conventional k-anonymization for dynamic databases. The latter is already studied by the
literature [44, 10] and such an extension to the framework is not theoretically challenging.
However supporting dynamic trajectory databases may introduce additional loss in utility.
We leave the practical evaluation of such an extension as future work.
4 Problem Formulation
4.1 Preliminaries and Notation
We assume the space is discretized into ǫs×ǫs size grids and a point in our domain is actually
a grid. All space measurements are in units of ǫs. We assume time is also discretized into
buckets of size ǫt and domain of time is finite. So datasets act as the snapshots of the world
in many time instances. Datasets with continuous time and space domains can be fit into
this assumption by the use of interpolations. The level of granularity in discretization does
not affect the efficiency of the proposed methodology.
We define a trajectory database in an object-oriented way. A trajectory dataset T is a set
of private entities or trajectories (e.g., T = {tr1, · · · , trn}, |T | = n). Each private entity tri
is an ordered set of spatio-temporal 3D volumes (e.g., points) composed of time, x, and
y dimensions (e.g., tri = {p1, · · · , pm} where pk =< tk, xk, yk >, |tri| = m). We assume
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We say a trajectory tr1 is a subset of another trajectory tr2 and write tr1 ⊂ tr2 if for each























j . We say a trajectory tr is atomic if |xi| = |yi| = |ti| = 1 for every pi ∈ tr.
We use the notation BBP for the 3D point with minimum volume that covers all points
inside set P (E.g., minimum bounding box).
We also assume S is the universal space (the maximum area possible in the space domain),
T is the universal time (the maximum time interval in the time domain), and U is the
universal volume (U = S · T ).
k-Anonymity property for single tables can be formally defined as;
Definition 1 (k-Anonymity). A table T ∗ is k-anonymous w.r.t. a set of attributes QI if each
record in T ∗[QI] appears at least k times.
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4.2 Problem Definition
We assume that prior to release, the trajectory database is complete and static. No uniquely
identifying information is released. However we assume that we have adversaries that
may
1. already know some portion of the trajectory of an individual in the dataset and may
be interested in the rest. (e.g., adversary knows that a particular person lives in a
particular house. He also knows that she leaves the house and comes back home at
specified times. He is interested in finding the locations she visited.)
2. already know the whole trajectory of an individual but be interested in some sensi-
tive information about the individual. This is a concern if some sensitive info is also
released, as part of the database, for some of the spatio-temporal triplets or for some
individuals. Sensitive info, for example, could be the requests done by the individual
to location based services.
We protect privacy of the individuals against the above adversary by using the following
techniques
• k-Anonymity: anonymize the dataset so that every trajectory is indistinguishable
from k − 1 other trajectories.
• Reconstruction: release atomic trajectories sampled randomly from the area covered
by anonymized trajectories.
k-Anonymity limits the adversary’s ability to link any information to an individual. Re-
construction further prevents leakage due to anonymization. Both techniques are discussed
in Sections 5 and 6.
Since reconstruction is just sampling from anonymized data, expectation on the amount
of privacy-utility depends only on the anonymization. As an anonymization is required to
satisfy the privacy constraints, it also needs to maximize the utilization. An anonymization
with a reconstruction that better explains the data is considered to be highly utilized. How-
ever the amount of utilization also depends on the target applications. Although there may
be many classes of target applications, in this work, we consider two of them:
Time Sensitive Applications: This class covers the applications in which the time com-
ponent is crucial compared to space components. Trajectories that have similar paths in
space, but occur in different time periods are considered to be far away from each other.
Such applications include mining traffic data to monitor traffic jams, anomaly detection
when timely access control constraints are in place, etc.
Space Sensitive Applications: Similarities are calculatedw.r.t. space. Time shifted trajecto-
ries or trajectories with different velocities can be considered to be close. Target applications
includemining theworld for region popularity tomake business decisions, measuring road
erosion caused by vehicles for maintenance, etc.
Section 6.2 discusses that some anonymization tr∗ of trminimizing the following equation




[ws(log |xi|+ log |yi|) + wt log |ti|]
+(|tr| − |tr∗|) · (ws logS + wt logT ) (1)
1We postpone the discussion on the reasoning behind using the log cost as a metric until Section 6.2
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Figure 1: Anonymization Process
a. trajectories tr1,tr2, and tr3; b. anonymization tr
∗ of tr1 and tr2; c. anonymization of
tr∗ and tr3; d. point matching used in the anonymization of tr1,tr2, and tr3. Matching
contains five point links
where ws and wt are weights to adjust sensitivity to space and time respectively.
From now on, our objective is to minimize Equation 1 while respecting k-anonymity in
anonymizations. In later sections to ease the discussion, we assume, without loss of gener-
ality, ws = wt = 1 unless noted otherwise.
5 Anonymization of Trajectories
In this section, we redefine the k-anonymity notion for sets of trajectories. Next, we propose
a condensation based approach to form groups of close trajectories. Finally, we show how
to k-anonymize trajectories in a given group.
5.1 k-Anonymity for Trajectory Databases
Original k-anonymity prevents an adversary from identifying a given QI to be in a set
with less than k elements in the anonymized dataset. Since we assume adversaries know
about all or some of the spatio-temporal points about an individual, the set of all points
corresponding to a trajectory can be used as the quasi identifiers in our application domain.
k-anonymity requires that a given trajectory in the original dataset can at best be linked to
at least k trajectories in the anonymized dataset. It can be shown easily that the following
definition for k-anonymity satisfies the requirement and also preserves the truth of the
original dataset:
Definition 2 (Trajectory k-Anonymity). A trajectory database T ∗ is a k-anonymization of a
trajectory dataset T if
• for every trajectory in T ∗, there are at least k − 1 other trajectories with exactly the
same set of points.
• trajectories in T and T ∗ can be sorted in such a way that the ith trajectories tr∗i ∈ T
∗,
tri ⊂ tr
∗ satisfies tri ⊂ tr
∗
i for all i.
Following definitions are essential for the anonymization of a set of trajectories.
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Definition 3 (Point Link and Matching). A point link between a set of trajectories TR =
{tr1, · · · , trn} is an ordered set of points PL = {p1, · · · , pn} such that pi ∈ tri. An ordered
set of point links between trajectories in TR, PM = {PL1, · · · , PLm}, is a point matching





Example 4. Figure 1.d shows a point matching between trajectories tr1, tr2, and tr3. Note
that point links are ordered, they do not overlap and there may be unmatched points in
any of the trajectories.
Theorem 5. Let TR = {tr1, · · · , trn} be a set of trajectories and PM = {PL1, · · · , PLm}
be a valid point matching between them. Let TR∗ = {tr∗1 , · · · , tr
∗
n} be another set such that
tr∗1 .pi = · · · = tr
∗
n.pi = BBPLi . Then TR
∗ is an n-anonymization of TR.
Proof. Since all the n elements in TR∗ are the same, the first requirement of anonymity
trivially holds. Since each point in tr∗j is a bounding box for some point in trj ; trj ⊂ tr
∗
j .
The second requirement also holds.
Example 6. Figure 1.c shows the 3-anonymization of tr1, tr2, and tr3 through the point
matching in d. Unmatched points are suppressed in the anonymization.
Theorem 5 states that any matching between the points of a given set of trajectories can
be used to anonymize the trajectories. Although there are many possible matchings, the
aim of the anonymization is to find the one that will minimize the log cost of the resulting
anonymization.
5.2 Trajectory Grouping
Although there are numerous k-anonymity algorithms proposed for single table datasets,
a grouping based approach is shown to be more suitable for the anonymization of complex
structures, due to the direct identification of private entities (trajectories in our case) be-
ing anonymized [39]. Most clustering algorithms can easily be modified for k-anonymity
by enforcing that the size of the clusters should be more than k [2, 38, 14, 1]. The only
challenge at this stage is to define a distance metric for trajectories. Since our objective is
to minimize the log cost metric, we can define the distance of two trajectories as the cost
of their optimal anonymization. Having said that the problem reduces to finding the cost
optimal anonymization of given two trajectories.
Finding the optimal anonymization of two trajectories is the same as finding the point
matching between the two trajectories such that anonymizing the trajectories through the
matching minimizes the log cost. A similar alignment problem is well studied for strings
(where the goal is to find an alignment of strings such that total pairwise edit distance
between the strings is minimized) in the context of DNA comparisons. Alignment problem
for two trajectories is polynomial and can be solved by using a dynamic programming
approach. The equation that solves the alignment problem for optimizing against a given
incremental function σ is given in Table 1. The log cost metric (LCM) is also incremental
and defines σ as follows:




So the distance between two trajectories tr1 and tr2 is given by
DST (tr1, tr2) = OPTσLCM (tr1, tr2)
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 2 (2009)
56 Mehmet Ercan Nergiz, Maurizio Atzori, Yu¨cel Saygın, Barıs¸ Gu¨c¸





σ(pi,⊥), |tr2| = 0;
∑
pi∈tr2
σ(pi,⊥), |tr1| = 0;
min{OPTσ(tr1 − tr1.p1 , tr2 − tr2.p1) + σ(tr1.p1, tr2.p1),
OPTσ(tr1 , tr2 − tr2.p1) + σ(tr2.p1,⊥),
OPTσ(tr1 − tr1.p1 , tr2) + σ(tr1.p1,⊥)}, |tr1|, |tr2| > 0.
The pseudocode to calculate the log cost distance between two trajectories is given in
Algorithm 1. The output of the Algorithm 1 is the distance of the given two trajectories and
the optimal point matching that minimizes the log cost.
Algorithm 1 Dynamic programming algorithm that calculates the distance between two
trajectories and returns a minimum cost point matching
Require: Trajectories tr1 = {p1, · · · , pm}, tr2 = {p1, · · · , pn}
Ensure: return the distance between tr1 and tr2 and the associated point matching PM .
1: PM = {}
2: LetM be a (m+ 1)× (n + 1) matrix.
3: M [i][0] = i · logU for all i ∈ [0−m]
4: M [0][j] = j · logU for all j ∈ [0− n]
5: i = 1, j = 1
6: while i <= m do
7: while j <= n do
8: M [i][j] = min{ M [i − 1][j − 1] + logBBtr1.pi,tr2.pj , M [i][j − 1] + logU,
M [i− 1][j] + logU}
9: ifM [i][j] = M [i− 1][j − 1] + logBBtr1.pi,tr2.pj then
10: PM+ = {tr1.pi, tr2.pj} //link tri.pi and tr2.pj
11: end if
12: j+ = 1
13: end while
14: i+ = 1
15: end while
16: Return the distanceM [m][n] and the point matching PM .
In this paper, we adopted and slightly modified the condensation based grouping algo-
rithm given in [1] for trajectory k-anonymity. multi TGA given in Algorithm 2, in each
iteration, creates an empty group G, randomly samples one trajectory tr ∈ TR, puts tr into
G, sets the group representative repG = tr. Next, the closest trajectory tr
′ ∈ TR−G to repG
is specified (line 6). tr′ is added into G and group representative repG is updated as the an-
onymization of repG and tr
′ (line 8). Update of repG andGwith new trajectories continues
until G contains k trajectories. At the end of each iteration, a new group of k trajectories is
formed, which is then removed from TR. Trajectories in every group are anonymized with
each other (details are in Section 5.3.). Iteration stops when there are less than k trajectories
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remaining in TR.
The costly operation in the grouping algorithm is finding the closest trajectory to the
group representative (line 6). This nearest neighbor operation needs to be done |TR| times
and it is difficult to speed up each operation by indexing. (This is because our distance met-
ric does not satisfy triangular inequality.) To decrease the number of operations, we also try
another version of algorithm 2 (fast TGA) by skipping the update of group representative
(e.g., skipping of line 9). In this case, k − 1 closest trajectories to the group representative
can be found in one pass so the number of nearest neighbor operations will be |TR|
k
. The
resulting algorithm is faster by a factor of k but expected to have less utility since it does
not directly optimize against log cost function. Experiments on the time/utility relations
between fast and multi TGA algorithms are provided in Section 7.
Algorithm 2multi & fast TGA(TR, k)
Require: Set of trajectories TR, integer k > 1, the log distance metric
Ensure: return k-anonymization of the trajectories in TR.
1: repeat
2: Let G be an empty group with group representative repG
3: Let tr ∈ TR be a randomly selected trajectory.
4: G = {tr}, repG = tr.
5: repeat
6: Let tr′ ∈ TR−G be the closest trajectory to repG.
7: G+ = tr′,
8: ifmulti TGA then
9: repG = anonTraj(repG, tr
′).
10: end if
11: until |G| = k
12: anonTraj(G)
13: TR− = G
14: until |TR| < k
15: Suppress remaining trajectories in TR.
5.3 Anonymization Algorithm
Once the groups are formed, the trajectories inside each group need to be anonymized. As
mentioned before, the anonymization process needs to specify the optimal point matching
that will minimize the log cost. Finding the optimal matching between two trajectories is
easy. Algorithm specifies the point pairs between the trajectories by tracing OPTσLCM and
anonymizes the paired points w.r.t. each other (by replacing the points with the minimum
bounding box that covers the points). Any unmatched points are suppressed.
The real challenge is to find the optimal point matching between n > 2 trajectories. Similar
versions of the problem on strings were proven to be NP-Hard [29]. Trajectory alignment
and its complexity is not yet studied. Now, we formalize and prove the NP-Hardness of
the decision trajectory alignment problem (DTA):
Definition 7 (DTA Problem). Given a set of trajectories TR = {tr1, · · · , trn} for arbitrary
n > 2, is there a point matching PM between the trajectories in TR such that the log cost
(with arbitrary weights ws and wt) of anonymizing TR through PM is at most c?(i.e., is
DTA(TR) ≤ c?)
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Figure 2: NP-Hardness Reduction Construction
We first assume the log cost function has parameters ws = 1,wt = 0. Extension of the
proof for cost functions with arbitrary weight parameters will be discussed later. We prove
that DTA is NP-Hard by reducing from the longest common subsequence problem (LCS)
which is proven to be NP-Hard for a sequence alphabet of size 2 [33]:
Definition 8 (LCS Problem). Given an integer ℓ and a set of sequences SQ = {sq1, · · · , sqn}
where each sqi = {s1, · · · , sm} is an ordered set of strings from the alphabet
∑
= {0, 1}; is
there a common subsequence of sequences in SQwith length at least ℓ? (i.e., is LCS(SQ) ≥
ℓ?)
For an instance (ℓ, SQ) of LCS,we create the set of input trajectories TRSQ = {tr1, · · · , trn}
for DTA, as follows: setting |tri| = |sqi|
tri.pj =
{
< [j - j + 1], [0-1], [0-1] >, sqi.sj = 0;
< [j - j + 1], [1-2], [1-2] >, sqi.sj = 1.
Figure 2 shows an example trajectory construction for a given set of sequences.
Lemma 9. For a sequence SQ = {sq1, · · · , sqn}, LCS(SQ) ≥ ℓ if and only if DTA(TRSQ) ≤






← ) Suppose sq′ = {s′1, · · · , s
′
ℓ} is one common subsequence, and let in
i
j return
the index of s′i in sqj . Observe that PM = {PL1, · · · , PLℓ} where PLi.pj = trj .pinij is
a valid point matching for TRSQ. Since sq1.sini
1
= · · · = sqn.sinin = s
′
i; we have, (using
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the notation
S
= as an equality operator for points having the same spatial components)
PLi.p1
S
= · · ·
S
= PLi.pn for every 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. This implies that every point in a point
link has the same spatial components. So anonymizing TRSQ through PM will match ℓ
space-similar points. The final anonymization will have a unit (1 × 1) area in ℓ positions.
Assuming the worst anonymization (in this case, an area of 2 × 2) for the t − n · ℓ points,
we have a log cost at most (t− n · ℓ) log 4 + n · ℓ log 1 = (t− n · ℓ) log 4.
(
if
→) Let PM = {PL1, · · · , PLr} be the point matching resulting in at most (t− n · ℓ) log 4
log cost. Let PM0 = {PLi ∈ PM | PLi.p1
S
= · · ·
S
= PLi.pn} and PM
1 = PM−PM0. (PM0
contains the point links that connect space similar points. Every link in PM1 contains at
least two spatially different points.) Since we have only two points in our domain, the
points in PM1 will add a log cost of the whole space (an area of 2 × 2). The same cost
applies also for points unmatched (suppressed). However the points in PM0 will have
unit (1 × 1) area. Since the total number of points in PM0 is n|PM0|, we have;
LCM(TR∗SQ) ≤ (t− n · ℓ) log 4
n|PM0| log 1 + (t− n|PM0|) log 4 ≤ (t− n · ℓ) log 4
(t− n|PM0|) log 4 ≤ (t− n · ℓ) log 4
|PM0| ≥ ℓ
This means that we have a possible matching of size at least ℓ where the points linked to
each other are space-similar. The reverse construction of the (
onlyif
← ) proof states that such
a matching implies a common subsequence of length at least ℓ.
Theorem 10. DTA problem is NP-Hard.
Proof. Theorem follows from the above construction when we ignore the effect of time
component in the log cost function (wt = 0). However, the proof can be modified to prove
NP-Hardness of any fixed log cost function with any selection of weight parameters. The
intuition is to prevent the effect of time component on finding the optimal matching. (The
same matching needs to be optimal regardless of the value of wt.) This can be done by
adjusting the domains of space and time components such that increase in cost due to
time generalizations will be negligible compared to the cost due to space generalizations.
(ws logS >> n · wt logT where S and T are the universal space and time respectively.)
Given the similar nature of the string and trajectory alignment problems, we adopted the
string alignment heuristic given in [24] (where an upper bound on the total pairwise dis-
tance for the output alignment is guaranteed) for trajectory alignment problem. Algorithm
anonTraj given in Algorithm 3 uses the following heuristic to come upwith a possible align-
ment of points. Algorithm first identifies the trajectory trm whose total pairwise log cost
distancewith other trajectories is minimum andmarks trm as done. At each step,OPTσLCM
finds the optimal matching between the points of one unmarked trajectory trnew and the
current anonymization of the marked trajectories, and marks trnew. Each matching creates
links between the points. Point suppressions and generalizations are applied according to
the matching. (Figure 1 shows an example anonymization of three trajectories.) In later
sections, we show experimentally that alignment heuristic works in practice.
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Algorithm 3 anonTraj(G)
Require: a (set) group of trajectories G.
Ensure: anonymize the trajectories inside G.
1: let trm ∈ G be the trajectory whose total pairwise distance with other trajectories is
minimum.
2: let set of trajectoriesM contains initially trm.
3: repeat
4: let tr∗ be the anonymization of trajectories inM through linked points.
5: let trnew ∈ G−M be a randomly chosen trajectory
6: run OPTσLCM to find a min cost matching between the points in trnew and tr
∗
7: create links between the points matched by OPTσLCM .
8: suppress all unmatched points and all points directly or indirectly linked to un-
matched points.
9: M = M + trnew
10: untilM = G
11: for all unsuppressed point p of each tr ∈M do
12: let PL be the point link containing p.
13: p = BBPL
14: end for
6 Randomized Reconstruction
6.1 Reconstruction as a Privacy Method
Trajectory anonymization techniques preserve the truth of the data while providing protec-
tion against certain adversaries. However, the approach suffers from the following short-
comings.
1. Use of minimum bounding boxes in anonymization discloses uncontrolled informa-
tion about exact locations of the points. (E.g., in the case of two trajectories, two
non-adjacent corners give out the exact locations.) This information may be critical
for applications where existence of a trajectory in a dataset is sensitive. (E.g., an ex-
ample of such applications is studied in [37]. The presence or absence of individuals
in a given dataset is protected by bounding the existence probabilities.)
2. It is challenging to take full advantage of information contained in anonymizations.
Most data mining and statistical applications work on atomic trajectories
The first problem can beweakened by applying some cloaking on the sides of the rectangle
or by partitioning the space into grids and returning set of grids covering all points.
The second problem is more tricky as it is a common problem for heterogenous anonymiza-
tions with large output domain. (most clustering based anonymity algorithms suffer from
the same problem.) One proposed technique to solve this issue is reconstruction [38, 1]
where an atomic dataset is recreated from the anonymized dataset by uniformly selecting
atomic points from anonymized regions. It is experimentally shown in [38] that reconstruc-
tion is sufficiently successful in learning from anonymized data.
In this work, we adapt the reconstruction approach as a means for privacy protection
(as in [1]) and release reconstructed data rather than anonymized data. The intuition be-
hind is that reconstruction not only serves as a solution to learn from the heterogeneous
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Figure 3: Reconstruction Process
Table 2: Reconstruction trR of tr∗






(|xi| · |yi| · |ti|)
, atomic tr′ ⊂ tr∗;
0, otherwise.
anonymized datasets but also greatly weakens the first problem without requiring a user
input. We define the reconstruction trR of trajectory tr∗ in Table 2.
An example reconstruction is shown in Figure 3. The output after reconstruction is atomic
and suitable for any trajectory application.
6.2 Maximizing Utility: The Log Cost Metric
The success of the anonymization heavily depends on the success of the reconstructed data
in explaining the original data. Since we have tr ⊂ tr∗ between original trajectory tr and
its anonymization tr∗, the probability of generating the original trajectory is non-zero and



















log |xi|+ log |yi|+ log |ti|) (2)
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The Equation 2 equally weights the effects of time and space on the reconstruction. This
is not desirable if we have the class of target applications given in Section 5. So instead, we
weight the log cost metric;
∑
pi∈tr∗
ws(log |xi|+ log |yi|) + wt log |ti| (3)
Since a given anonymization tr∗ of tr does not contain the points suppressed in tr, Equa-
tion 3 does not add any log cost regarding those suppressed points. However, a sup-
pressed point can be safely thought as a point covering the whole universal space.2 The




[ws(log |xi|+ log |yi|) + wt log |ti|]
+(|tr| − |tr∗|) · (ws logS + wt logT ) (4)
7 Experiments
We implemented the proposed anonymization technique in Java. In order to assess the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed techniques, we tested them on both synthetic and real datasets.
Real Dataset: We used the GPS traces of taxis in Milano obtained in the context of the
GeoPKDD project [16]. Dataset contains the traces collected over a month from GPS de-
vices installed in taxis. We compiled 1000 trajectories from the real data set with a total of
98544 points. In Figure 4, we show the anonymization of two trajectories that are grouped
by our algorithm for k = 2. This is an example of how log distance captures the similarities
of trajectories in space.
Synthetic Dataset: We generated a synthetic dataset by using the state-of-the-art Brinkhoff
generator3. It contains 1000 spatio-temporal trajectories with an average length of 70 points,
for a total of 70118 spatio-temporal points. The spatial projection of the dataset is shown
in Figure 5. For a qualitative understanding of the log distance behavior, we also show 3
randomly-chosen groups of trajectories obtained by using k = 2. Trajectories in the same
group are clearly close in space and also similar in length (although not shown, also time
intervals are similar.)
Experiments focus on (1) measuring the amount of utility preserved after anonymization
and perturbation processes, (2) time performance, and (3) accuracy in query answering.
7.1 Utility
We compared the anonymized datasets (by varying k and the anonymization heuristics)
against the original ones and measured how different they are according to a number of
metrics.
2In fact, any fixed number could be assigned as the penalty of suppression.
3http://fh-oow.de/institute/iapg/personen/brinkhoff/generator/
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 2 (2009)
Towards Trajectory Anonymization: a Generalization-Based Approach 63
Figure 4: Original trajectories, anonymized trajectories, and reconstructed trajectories
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Figure 6: LCM for anonymizations - Milano Dataset
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 2 (2009)




























































Figure 7: Points removed in the anonymized dataset
7.1.1 Number of Removed Points
The anonymization step allows suppression of points or trajectories, depending on the cost
associated to suppression. We used a high cost for suppressions, but notice that since tra-
jectories may have different lengths, suppression may be required to enforce k-anonymity.
Figure 7 shows the results on two heuristics used in our experiments: multi, i.e. log dis-
tance was computed on multiple trajectories; and fast, where log distance was computed
only on trajectory pairs (see Section 5.3). As expected, the number of removed points gen-
erally increases with k for both datasets. For Milano data, multi and fast have showed little
difference w.r.t. no of suppressed points. But for synthetic dataset, multi has a low distor-
tion, with less than 9% of points removed even with k = 25 while fast heuristic needs to
remove nearly twice or three times the number of points removed by multi. For k = 2 the
two heuristics are equals, and the only small difference is due to the randomization in the
reconstruction of trajectories.
7.1.2 Distortion on Clustering
We also analyzed the utility of the anonymized datasets formining purposes. Wemeasured
the deviation from the original clustering results,i.e., we compare clusters obtained from
the original trajectory dataset (reference partition) against the clusters obtained from the
sanitized dataset (response partition). For the evaluation, we used a bottom-up complete-
link agglomerative clustering algorithm, coupled with the ERP distance metric [11], which
has been specifically developed for trajectories.
As the algorithm requires to specify the number of clusters as input, we experimented
with a range of 2 to 60 clusters. Our hierarchical clustering implementation requires O(n3)
distance computations (where n is the number of trajectories), and each ERP computation
requires, by using dynamic programming, O(l2) (where l is the longest trajectory). Note
that due to the large number of experiments and the complexity of the clustering algorithm
we used the whole comparison process required days of computation.
We used a standard approach to evaluate clusters. We considered every pair of trajectories
and verified whether both are in the same cluster in the reference partition and whether
they are in the response partition. We therefore have four cases, namely: true positive
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY 2 (2009)
















































































































k=2 fast k=5 fast k=10 fast k=25 fast random
(e) (f)
Figure 8: Clustering results - Milano Dataset
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Figure 9: Clustering results - Synthetic Dataset
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Figure 10: Time performance
(TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP), false negative (FN). Then we computed the
following standard measures:
• accuracy = (TP + TN)/(TP + FN + FP + TN);
• precision = TP/(TP + FP );
• and recall = TP/(TP + FN).
Figure 8 and 9 show the results computed from the Milano and synthetic datasets, by us-
ing various number of clusters. Figures 9(a,b,c), 8(a,b,c) show the behavior of the multi
heuristic, while on the second row Figures 9(d,e,f), 8(d,e,f) show a similar behavior for the
fast heuristic. In order to better understand the values of each measure used in the plots,
we also show results of a “random algorithm”, i.e. a randomly-selected reference partition
of uniformly distributed clusters. For a reasonable number of clusters (e.g., up to 20 for
synthetic dataset and nearly all parameters tested for Milano dataset) all the measures re-
ported high clustering performance. and both fast and multi resulted in similar levels of
distortion. We also notice that smaller k values result in less distortion, although there is
not a tight monotonicity due to the randomization steps.
7.2 Time Performance
In Figure 10, we show results on time performance. As we can see for both datasets, execu-
tion time grows almost linearly with increasing k formulti algorithm, while execution time
for fast is decreasing. As mentioned in Section 5.2, this is because multi performs k nearest
neighbor queries per group while fast requires only one. Also notice that multi required
almost 3 hours for k = 25; for datasets larger than 3K-4K trajectories, running time may
be infeasible for multi, while fast scales well. Recall that for Milano dataset, fast and multi
creates anonymizations of similar utility. This justifies the adequacy of fast heuristic.
7.3 Query Answering
We stress that most common uses of static datasets are statistical analysis and data mining
rather than querying. However querying the anonymizations is still valuable to under-
stand the behavior of the cost metric and the anonymization process. In this section, we
make use of spatio-temporal queries in order to
• compare time and space sensitive anonymizations.
• and observe how anonymizations respond to queries of different shapes.
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Figure 12: Query error over queries with increasing volume
We will be using our synthetic dataset, since we observed for Milano dataset that space
and time distances per pairs of points correlate with each other (e.g., points are close in
time iff they are also close in space).
Our queries are basically, 3D rectangular volumes drawn inside the space of the spatio-
temporal dataset. For an anonymization T ∗ of a dataset T , and a query volume Q, we are
interested in two measures:
Q(T ): The number of trajectories passing through (having at least one point in) Q in T .
Q(T ∗): The expected number of trajectories passing through Q in a reconstruction TR of
T ∗.
In a good anonymization, we would like the two measures be close to each other. Given




By itself, EQ is not very descriptive since it heavily depends on the volume and position
of the query and the number of suppressed points. (Even a bad anonymization might
give an EQ close to 0, for a Q with large volume.) However it can be used to compare
two anonymizations with similar number of suppressed points. Our aim is to measure the
behavior of time and space sensitivity.
We first created 1000 queries of varying size, shape, and location; and measured an aver-
age EQ value for both time-sensitive (wt = 1) and space-sensitive (wt = 0) anonymization,
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Figure 14: Query error over queries with increasing diagonal slope
t-fast and s-fast respectively. (t-fast preserves time better, s-fast preserves space better.) We
also created two totally random anonymizations, t-rand and s-rand, out of t-fast and s-fast
by using the same number of points and trajectories. These random anonymizations serve
as a lower bound on the utility of query answering. Figure 11 shows the average query
error of t-fast, s-fast, t-rand, and s-rand for varying k. As desired, both fast algorithms has
much lower error rates than their counter random versions. The difference decreases as k
increases since anonymizations gets closer to randomization (and loses utility).
Figure 12 shows a similar scenario for k = 5 but this time for 1000 queries of varying vol-
umes. The volumes are listed in the multiples of the whole space. This time error rate drops
with larger queries since the Q(T ) becomes bigger. (Error for the largest possible query
would be 0.) Figure 11 and 12 together show that t-fast is slightly better. The comparison
is trustworthy since the number of suppressed points are similar for both algorithms.
Next, we fixed the volume to be 0.05 and k=5, and created 1000 queries for each differ-
ent shapes. Figure 13 shows how anonymizations respond when we increase the length of
the time component of the queries. (Horizontal axis lists arctan of the slope of the query
diagonal with the space diagonal in celsius degrees.) A query with a low range time com-
ponent would be very sensitive to distortion of time information. This means that in Figure
13, query sensitivity to time decreases along the horizontal axis. As expected for low time
range queries, t-fast performs better. As the time range increases, s-fast outperforms t-fast.
Even though it is not shown here, same behavior persists for queries of different volumes.
Additional experiments shown in Figure 14 and 15 evaluate the effect of varying the shape
of the query in space. We fixed the time component of the query to be the highest range
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Figure 15: Query error over queries with decreasing diagonal slope
possible (e.g., factor out the time dimension). We again fixed the volume to be 0.05. We
created different shapes with different emphasis on x component and perform 1000 queries
for each shape. Figure 14 and 15 shows the behavior of the algorithms when query shapes
turn from rectangles to squares. (Horizantal axis shows arctan of the slope of the space
diagonal.) As expected, s-fast has consistently less query error. We also observed that
query errors increase for square queries. This is due to the log cost behavior. Given a
rectangle (high on one axis) and a square both with a diagonal of the same size, a rectangle
has a smaller volume, so statistically such anonymization is less costly. 4
8 Extension to Other Anonymity Standards
As we define and enforce k-anonymity for spatio-temporal databases, there are still issues
not addressed explicitly in this work.
k-anonymity provides de-identification for individually identifiable data. However, as
mentioned before, when sensitive information is present, k-anonymity does not necessarily
prevent the disclosure of the sensitive information. (As mentioned in item 2 of Section 4.2;
for trajectory datasets, sensitive information could be the requests done by the individual
to location based services.) This is mainly because k-anonymity does not enforce diversity
on the sensitive info within each equality groups. Such issues have been addressed with
alternative privacy definitions [28, 30, 32]. Such extensions on k-anonymity are generally
independent of the anonymization process; the inherit grouping mechanisms are modified
to enforce additional constraints. As mentioned in the paper, trajectory anonymization
can work with any clustering based grouping mechanism, thus any extension working on
clustering based k-anonymity also works in the domain of trajectories. (This is also true
for anonymization of dynamic databases [44, 10].) For example, it was stated in [39] that
ℓ-diversity5 can be achieved:
• by applying a higher (or infinite) weight between the entities with similar sensitive
values as stated in [9].
4This may not be a desired property always. Even though such an approach would preserve statistical prop-
erties better, human mind tends to view world in an Euclidean space. This makes the log cost metric difficult to
use for visualization purposes.
5A set of sensitive values is ℓ-diverse if the entropy of the set is more than log(ℓ). An anonymization satisfies
ℓ-diversity if the sets of sensitive attributes within each equality group are ℓ-diverse
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Table 3: Constraint Enforcing TGA
Require: Same as in TGA (Algorithm 2)
Ensure: return an anonymization of the trajectories in TR where each group satisfies the
given constraint.
1: run TGA with k = 2. Let C− and C+ be the set of clusters where the constraint is
violated and not violated respectively.
2: repeat
3: let c ∈ C− be a cluster
4: let cclosest ∈ C
− be the closest cluster to c
5: merge cclosest and c into cmerged.
6: if cmerged satisfies the constraint then
7: Put cmerged in C
+.
8: else
9: Put cmerged in C
−.
10: end if
11: C− = C− − {c, cclosest}
12: until |C−| ≤ 1
13: anonymize trajectories in each cluster of C+ w.r.t. each other.
14: Suppress remaining trajectories in TR.
• by using a bottom-up [top-down] hierarchical clustering approach (note that themethod-
ology presented in this paper is independent of the clustering algorithm) and merge
[partition] clusters until [only if] diversity requirement is not violated, or
• by simply suppressing those clusters violating the constraints. This approach has the
advantage of being resistant against minimality attacks [46].
We present an example bottom-up algorithm in Table 3 which uses the samemethodology
in [39]. Any constraint on the equality groups can be enforced by using the given algorithm.
Such constraints include;
• constraints on the distribution of sensitive attributes: Such constraints are enforced
by many k-anonymity extensions on micro data. [28, 30, 32, 37].
• constraints on the size of the bounding boxes: If k cars have the same spatio-temporal
points, they are likely to be grouped together, and no generalization would be ap-
plied. This is not always desired especially when location information is sensitive.
• constraints on the coverage of the bounding boxes: For trajectories that traverse over
a mapping, enforcing constraints on the size of the bounding boxes will not be suf-
ficient. Constraints should be enforced over the number of sensitive nodes that are
being covered by bounding boxes.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we address privacy issues regarding the identification of individuals while
sharing trajectory datasets. We redefine the notion of k-anonymity for sequences of spatio-
temporal points, and further enforce privacy by releasing only a randomly generated set
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of representative trajectories. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first generaliza-
tion based approach for trajectory anonymization which exploits previous results on string
alignment. In order to further protect privacy against boundary-based attacks, we also
propose an additional, simple reconstruction step. Experiments on real and synthetic data
show that the log distance and the heuristics proposed are effective for publishing trajec-
tory datasets.
We also show how the techniques given in this paper can be adapted to many other ano-
nymity standards. However we leave the practical evaluation of enforcing such standards
to trajectories as a future study.
When multiple k-anonymizations of the same private entities are released, a privacy at-
tack known as intersection attack becomes possible (where two equality groups containing
a specific individual are intersected to identify an individual). So releasing anonymizations
of trajectories in a fixed region per period may be subject to this type of attack. However,
such an attack is possible only if the quasi-identifiers (and the sensitive attributes) do not
change over time, and as for the trajectories, this is generally not the case. Designing in-
tersection resistant k-anonymization is not specific to trajectories but could be pursued as
a future study in general.
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